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A SPOOF OF JUSTICE: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONVICTIONS OF BOTH
SPOOFING AND COMMODITIES FRAUD FOR
THE SAME TRANSACTION
ABRAM OLCHYK*

To the fastest go the spoils. The rise of automated algorithmic trading has
transformed the American stock market into an institution prioritizingspeed
above all else. The relative chaos implicit in light-speed trading obscures the
view of regulators, providing an enterprising new breed of traders ample
opportunity to manipulate the market. The most recent scheme garneringthe
attention of state and federal agencies is known as spoofing, where a trader
initiates a precise pattern of trades to lure in buyers or sellers-thereby raising
or lowering the value of the commodity-trading on the distortion, then
cancellingthe baited tradesbefore they fully execute.
In 2014, a federal grand jury indicted Michael Coscia on charges of
criminal spoofing and commodities fraud. The indictment alleges Coscia
spoofed several trades by entering into large buy contracts-forpositions he
held-to create afalse sense of demand, selling off his positions at peak value,
then cancelling the buy orders before they executed. Coscia's indictment
focused on six transactions and contains a charge of both spoofing and
commodities fraud-a more general securities fraud statute-for each. This
Comment will make the novel argument that a conviction for both spoofing
and commodities fraud for the same transaction could be challenged under a
theory of double jeopardy as unconstitutionally duplicitous punishment. To
do so, this Comment will analyze the spoofing and commodities fraud statutes
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Candidate, May 2016, American Universily, Washington Colege of Law; BA Political Science,
2012, Syracuse University. First, I would like to thank Professors Michael Carroll and Amy
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would like to thank my girlfriend BonnieJones for her unwavering patience and unlimited
snacks. Finally, I would like to thank the American University Law Review staff for all their
work in making this piece publishable.
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to show that proof of the former will always prove the latter, and that,
therefore, a defendant cannot be convicted of both for the same transaction.
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"[T]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the
criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from
being twice tried for it."'
INTRODUCTION

Spivey2

In 2009, Daniel
began laying cable.' From Chicago, Illinois
to Carteret, New Jersey in the most direct route possible, he laid the
1. ExParte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173 (1873).
2. Daniel Spivey is the founder, president, and CEO of Spread Networks ("Spread").
Dan Spiney, SPREAD NEIwoRKs, http://spreadnetworks.com/management/managementteam/dan-spivey (last visited Oct 26, 2015). He developed the idea of decreasing
transmission time for stock and commodities orders by constructing a new, more direct
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fiber optic cable aiming to provide high frequency stock traders
active on both the New York' and Chicago exchanges with the fastest
available electronic connection between the two exchanges.' If
successful, the line would provide a trading speed unrivaled by those
trading on traditional routes"-and successful it was. The line,
owned by the newly-created Spread Networks ("Spread"),' trimmed
100 miles and three milliseconds-a relative eternity-off of the next
fastest route.' For reference, a human blink lasts roughly one tenth
of a second, or 100 milliseconds.' Forjust $300,000 per month with a
few million up front, traders on Spread's line now operate on
exchanges so quickly that only a privileged few even have the
technology to keep up.'o High-frequency trading firms now account
fiber optic cable to connect the exchanges in Carteret, New Jersey and Chicago, Illinois.
Dark Fiber, SPREAD NEIwORKs, http://spreadnetworks.com/products/dark-fiber (last visited
Oct 26, 2015). Spread Networks now sells access to that line. Id.
3. See Christopher Steiner, Wall Street's Speed War, FORBEs (Sept. 9, 2010, 10:00
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0927/outfront-netscape-jim-barksdaleAM),
daniel-spivey-wall-street-speed-war.html (explaining how the cable's advantage stems
from its direct route from Chicago to Carteret as opposed to older cable routes that
follow uneven railroad lines).
4. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in its current iteration actually
operates on a series of heavily guarded computer servers housed in Mahwah, New
Jersey. See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT 53 (2014) (tracing
the disconnect between the historic image of the NYSE trading floor with how the
exchange actually works).
5. See Steiner, supra note 3 (explaining that the new line's straight trajectory
between two cities allows it to transmit information much faster than older lines that
paralleled indirect railroad lines).
6. Traditional fiber cable routes between Chicago and New York follow paths
dictated by flat land, subject to restrictions prohibiting laying cable along interstate
highways. When those routes meet the Allegheny Mountains in Pennsylvania, they
begin to zigzag, increasing the line's length and adding transmission time to trade
requests. Spivey's cable cut through the mountains to gain its sizable speed
advantage. See LEWIS, supra note 4, at 10 (differentiating Spivey's route from
traditional cable routes).
7. See Steiner, supra note 3 (noting that Spread was the company that Spivey and his
backers

founded

to

operate

the

new

line);

see also Home, SPREAD

NErWORKS,

http://spreadnetworks.com (last visited Oct 26, 2015) (asserting that Spread is "[t]he
standard for reliable, high-bandwidth communications between NewYork and Chicago").
8. See Steiner, supra note 3 (recognizing the fast speed of 13.3 milliseconds at
which Spread's line transmits from Chicago to New York, whereas the next fastest line
transmits in 16.3 milliseconds and noting that in automated high frequency trading,
three milliseconds, or three one-thousandths of a second, is an enormous window).
9. See Stephen Reucroft & John Swain, How Often and Why Do People's Eyes Blink?,
Bos. GLOBE (May 14, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2007/
05/14/how-often-and-why-do-peopleseyesblink.
10. See LEWIS, supra note 4, at 18 (explaining how the Spread line allowed high
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for one half of all trading activity on U.S. stock exchanges." They
wield advanced hardware that, when combined with powerful
computer algorithms and blinding speed, allows for nearinstantaneous trading free of human intervention. 2
Effectively
regulating high frequency trading presents the difficult task of
managing an unfamiliar iteration of a bedrock American institution.
So as Congress investigates the possibility of a comprehensive
oversight structure," federal agencies are left to promulgate
piecemeal and more targeted rules in the interim.
The proliferation of high frequency trading as exemplified by the
success of Spread Networks gave rise to "spoofing," the loosely

frequency traders, who were already trading at an elite speed not publicly available,
to operate at an even faster level).
11. John McCrank, Exclusive: SEC Targets 10 Firms in High Frequency Trading
Probe-SECDocument, REUTERS (July 17, 2014, 5:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/07/17/us-sec-investigation-highfrequencytradin-idUSKBNOFM2T
W20140717. The effects of high frequency trading manifest in many different ways.
For example, the average holding period for stocks has dropped considerably from
eight years in the mid-twentieth century to five days in 2013. Nick Baumann, Too Fast
to Fail: Is High-Speed Trading the Next Wall Street Disaster?, MOTHERJONES (Feb. 4, 2013,
7:06 AM), http://www.mothegones.com/politics/2013/02/high-frequency-tradingdanger-risk-wall-street?page=1.
12. See Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading- Use and
Controversy, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 16, 2010, at 3, 5 (charting the vigorous growth of
automated trades as a percentage of total trading activity in the United States).
13. See, e.g., Christian Thompson, High-Speed Boys Get Their Day in Congress, Sort Of
Opening Line, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June
17, 2014, 6:06 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-17/high-speed-boys-get-theirday-in-congress-sort-of-opening-line (describing the various Senate investigations into
high frequency traders); Dina ElBoghdady, Senate Panel Looks into High-FrequencyStock
Trades, WASH. Posr (Sept 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/senate-panel-looks-into-high-frequency-stock-trades/201 2/09/20/
7d4b5b9c-0358-11e2-91e7-2962c74e7738-story.html (recounting a 2012 Senate
hearing investigating the connection between high frequency trading and
volatility in the stock market).
14. See, e.g., Beverly Goodman, Tapping the Brakes on High-Speed Trading, BARRON'S
(Feb. 25,2012), http://online.barrons.com/articles/SB5000142405274870375410457
7239231746043566 (noting the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) new
prioritization of high frequency trading regulation); Dave Michaels et al., Slow Cop,
Fast Beat:
SEC Takes Its Time on High-Frequency Trading Rules, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-0410/sec-takes-its-time-on-high-frequency-trading-rules (explaining the SEC's "sense of
urgency" to undertake "'appropriate regulatory responses'"); see also Antidisruptive
Practices Authority, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011)
[hereinafter Disruptive Practices Guidance] (exemplifying situational or otherwise
incomprehensive regulatory action).
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defined practice'" of entering into a trade with the intent to cancel
before execution." Spoofing is computer-on-computer crime: one
trader programs his trading algorithm to make bids when certain
market conditions present themselves, only to cancel the bids at such
speed that other traders' computers are left operating with
incrementally outdated market positions.'" The miniscule window of
time before the other computers self-correct allows the spoofer to
trade on a slightly inflated (or deflated) market, creating a narrow
profit margin.'" Spoofing regulation is still in its infancy; the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)," the regulator

with jurisdiction over the commodities exchanges,"o only began
issuing spoofing guidance in 2011,21 and other agencies are just
beginning to understand the scope of spoofing activities. 22
Actual enforcement of spoofing regulations is younger still.23 The

CFTC fined its first trader for spoofing in July 2013." His name was

15. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947 (drafting a preliminary
definition of"spoofing" and focusing on the practice as an intent-based violation).
16. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012).
17. See Peter J. Henning, 'Spoofing,' a New Crime with a Catchy Name, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 6, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/a-new-crimewith-a-catchy-name-spoofing (discussing this new form of market manipulation); see
alo Andrew M. Harris & Matthew Leising, High-Speed Trader Accused of Commodity
Market 'Spoofing, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Oct 2, 2014,
7:21
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-02/high-speed-trader-accused-of-commoditymarket-spoofing-.html (explaining how traders make profits from "spoofing").
18. See Henning, supra note 17 (explaining that spoofing can inflate the target's price
by creating the illusion of higher demand through fraudulent buy orders and deflate the
price by creating the illusion of higher supply through fraudulent sell orders).
19.

See About

the

CFTC,

U.S.

COMMODrIY

FuTuREs

TRADING

COMMISSION,

http://www.cftc.gov/About/index.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (stating that the
mission of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") is to promote
market integrity and ensure "the integrity of futures & options markets"). This
Comment focuses on CFTC regulation of spoofing because of the Commission's past
See infra note 26 and accompanying text
involvement with Michael Coscia.
(emphasizing the CFTC's past litigation with Coscia over his spoofing activities).
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 712, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
21. Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed
Mar. 18, 2011).
22. See McCrank, supra note 11 (noting that the SEC told its staff in March 2011 that it
was interested in any "tips, complaints, or referrals" concerning high-frequency trading).
23. See Henning, supra note 17 (noting the new prosecutorial priority of
prosecuting spoofing).
24. Phil Albinus, HFT Firm Hit with $3.1M Fine for Market Spoofing,
FIERCEFINANCEIT (July 24, 2013), http://www.fiercefinanceit.com/story/hft-firm-hit31m-fine-market-spoofing/2013-07-24.
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Michael Coscia,2 5 and the nearly $3.1 million in penalties 26 levied by

various entities on his company, Panther Energy Trading LLC,
signaled a new willingness of regulators to investigate and punish
spoofers. 27
However, until very recently, penalties for spoofing
remained civil in nature, consisting of mostly fines, profit
disgorgements, and trading bans.2 ' But, in October 2014, the highfrequency trading industry was put on notice when a federal grand
jury issued the first criminal indictment for spoofing.'
The indictment involved a familiar party: Michael Coscia of
Panther Energy Trading LLC.o However, Coscia's indictment was
unique in that his twelve criminal counts attached to only six total
transactions."
Each transaction involved carried one count of
spoofing and one count of commodities fraud.12 As each transaction
carried both charges, the question then arose: what is the difference
between commodities fraud and spoofing? If Coscia is convicted on
all counts, the answer to that question may render future
convictions-where the defendant is charged with both spoofing and

25. Id.
26. See id. (calculating that of the $3.1 million in total penalties, $1.4 million
came from a settlement with the CFTC, $800,000 from the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, and approximately $900,000 from the Financial Conduct Authority, a
U.K. financial regulator).
27. SeeElBoghdady, supra note 13 (describing new enforcement actions from the CFTC
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to address high-frequency trading).
28. See, e.g., In re Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL
3817473 (July 22, 2013) (offering a settlement agreement with the agency consisting
of admission of jurisdiction, waiver of hearing, judicial review, any claims of double
jeopardy stemming from the civil penalty, consent to fines from the various involved
agencies, and agreement to a one-year trading ban).
29. United States v. Coscia, No. 14 CR 551, 2015 WL 1805955 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16,
2015); see Denny Gulino, Sudden US Criminal Crackdown on 'Spoofing' Leaves HFT
Spooked, MNI (Oct. 3, 2014, 8:20 AM), https://mninews.marketnews.com/content/
sudden-us-criminal-crackdown-spoofing-leaves-hft-spooked (citing insecurity in the
high-frequency trading industry as to whether Coscia's indictment-the first of its
kind to include criminal spoofing charges-is a short-lived episode or indicative of a
larger enforcement priority); Paul J. Pantano et al., Clients & Friends Memo: First
CriminalProsecutionfor Spoofing: High Frequency TradingFirm Owner Indicted in Northern
District of Illinois, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAwr LLP (Oct. 7, 2014),
http://www.cadwalader.com/uploads/cfmemos/757238cG928f0ellbcc374f7573e
1d79.pdf (explaining Michael Coscia's indictment and its impact on the highfrequency trading industry).
30. Indictment at 1, United States v. Coscia, No. 14 CR 551 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
31. Id. at 1, 9-19.
32. Id.
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commodities fraud-vulnerable to a constitutional challenge
grounded in double jeopardy" jurisprudence.
This Comment will argue that defendants might successfully
challenge convictions where both commodities fraud and spoofing
charges attach to the same transaction under a theory of double
jeopardy. It will argue that although commodities fraud and spoofing
are two distinct statutory provisions, they fail the "same transaction"
test established in Blockburger v. United States," which prohibits
multiple punishments for two charges where proof of one necessarily
constitutes proof of the other." It will show that, once distilled into
their simplified components, the elements of spoofing and
commodities fraud overlap such that proving the former will always
prove the latter. Additionally, this Comment will explore several
canons of statutory construction" to illustrate some relevant legal
underpinnings to the Blockburgerrule.
Part I of this Comment will provide background on the nature and
character of spoofing and commodities fraud charges. It will also
provide an overview of the Blockburger standard and subsequent
iterations, as well as explore the relevant canons of statutory
construction. Part II of this Comment will first interpret the elements
of both charges in light of relevant case law to distill elements for
comparison. It will then evaluate and analyze those elements in light
of the Blockburger test to show that proving a spoofing violation will
always prove commodities fraud; therefore, a defendant may only
constitutionally be convicted of one of the offenses for each
transaction in a given indictment. Additionally, it will show how
certain canons of statutory construction help illuminate the intent
and application of the Blockburgertest.

33. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (prohibiting any individual from being "subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
34. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
35. See id. at 303-04 (analyzing two sections of the Narcotics Act to determine
"whether, both sections being violated by the same act, the accused committed two
offenses or only one").
36. Specifically, this Comment will analyze the maxims of lex specialis derogat lex
generalis (specialized laws prevail over general laws), the "merger doctrine," and the
rule of lenity. See Otto Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Doublejeopardy, 58 YALE
L.J. 513, 517-18 (1949) (introducing the "speciality" principle as a type of offense
scheme where concurrent application of different norms applies).
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BACKGROUND

HistoricalOverview of Spoofing Regulation

Spoofing regulation originated in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Section 747
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).
of Dodd-Frank amended the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) 3 1 to
add a section governing trading activities deemed to be "Disruptive
Practices."3 ' The Disruptive Practices section declares it
unlawful for any person to engage in any trading, practice, or
conduct on or subject to the rules of a registered entity that. . . is,
is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as,
"spoofing" (bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or
offer before execution). 40
But, in an industry where upwards of ninety percent of all trades
are cancelled before execution,' uncertainty remains as to the exact
scope of the regulation and as to the kinds of activities it is
attempting to regulate.4 '
These questions were the subject of
substantial
discussion
between
regulators
and
industry
representatives. 4 ' Those discussions yielded guidance from the CFTC
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010).
38. See id. (containing the initial language prohibiting spoofing); Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (2012).
39. See Dodd-Frank § 747 (amending the CEA to include identical language to
the current spoofing statute).
40. Id.
41. See Scott Patterson & Andrew Ackerman, SEC May Ticket Speeding Traders;
High-Frequency Firms Face Fees on Canceled Transactions, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203918304577239440668644280
(quoting the Tabb Group, an electronic trading tracking organization, to estimate
that between ninety-five and ninety-eight percent of all trades made by highfrequency traders are cancelled before execution to adjust instantaneously to
changing market conditions).
42. See generally Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Staff Roundtable on
Disruptive Trading Practices (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/
public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission24_120210-transcri.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Roundtable] (citing panelists' varying opinions
regarding disruptive trading practices). Prior to issuing their spoofing guidance, the
CFTC held a multi-paneled discussion featuring government officials and industry
representatives. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,948
(proposed Mar. 18, 2011) (listing panels that covered topics including spoofing,
challenges to fair trade, and potential new disruptive trading practices). The panels
addressed questions about statutory definitions, best practices, and potential
challenges and pitfalls facing new regulation. Id.
43. See generally Roundtable, supra note 42 (quoting several prominent
members of the high frequency trading industry to show the lack of unified
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clarifying that actionable spoofing includes both an element of
scienter (intent to deceive) and a corresponding good faith defense."
The guidance from the CFTC, published in the Federal Register in
March 2011," addressed a variety of stock trading industry concerns
over the parameters for spoofing regulation." Chief among these
concerns was that CEA § 6c(a) (5) (C), which purported to regulate
spoofing, actually provided little clarity as to a universally accepted
definition. 7 The resulting CFTC guidance provided a unifying
concept-that spoofing necessarily incorporates an element of
intent-which was followed by a patchwork of examples." Such
vagaries and inconsistencies in definition persist even in common
usage." Regardless of the uncertainty as to the exact parameters of
spoofing, the central elements remain clear: bidding with the intent
to cancel so as to deceive or otherwise manipulate other market
participants or machinations."o

parameters in spoofing regulation).
44. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947 (clarifying the
Commission's view that spoofing requires a bad-faith intent to cancel, which
accommodates a corresponding good faith trading defense).
45. Id. at 14,943.
46. See id. at 14,947 (noting in the introduction to the spoofing portion that the
guidance responded to industry concerns about a lack of a unified definition of
spoofing, the treatment of legitimate trading behavior, and possible exemptions
for partial fill orders).
47. See Roundtable, supra note 42, at 64 (statement of Gary DeWaal, Newedge
USA, LLC) ("I'm not sure of [sic] the definition of spoofing can be agreed upon by
the ten people around this table."); see also id. at 111 (statement of Cameron Smith,
Quantlab Financial, LLC) ("I wish I could give you a little pithy definition that would
capture it all, but it's not easy.").
48. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947; see also Roundtable,
supra note 42, at 28, 90, 93, 133 (listing practices such as submitting and cancelling
bids, submitting and cancelling to overload the quotation system, submitting or
cancelling bids to delay another's trading, and submitting or cancelling bids to
create false market depth, as other examples of spoofing behavior).
49. Compare Henning, supra note 17 (defining spoofing as an act of attracting
market participants by fooling them "into believing there are large orders for futures
contracts"), with Gulino, supra note 29 (defining spoofing as a practice of placing
and almost instantaneously canceling orders to, among other things, "gauge
demand" and "set up opposing trades").
50. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947 (referencing the
inclusion of the bidding with intent to cancel the mechanism in all identified
spoofing practices); see alo Roundtable, supra note 42, at 36 (statement of Adam
Nunes, Hudson River Trading Group) (specifying that spoofing clearly must involve
illegitimate trading behavior and an intent to manipulate).
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Commodities Fraud: A New Weapon From Sarbanes-Oxley

The commodities fraud statute was enacted as part of the SarbanesOxley Act in 2002.5' The fraud provision is triggered when a party
knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice ...

(1) to defraud any person in connection with any

commodity for future delivery, or ... (2) to obtain, by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, any money or property in connection with the
purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery. ...
The provision's language is purposefully broad so as to divorce its
elements from more technical securities laws requirements" and to
give prosecutors a more versatile weapon to fight fraud."
Prosecutors apply the statute in a similar manner to the mail and
wire fraud statutes.
A prosecutor must first prove a violation of
either subsection one or two, but not both, for there to be a
violation." Even so, the elements of commodities fraud may be
simply stated as only: (1) a fraudulent intent; (2) a scheme or
artifice; and (3) a connection with a security."
The exact level of fraudulent intent required is of some dispute, as
different courts have used a variety of standards to satisfy the

51. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012).
53. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond:
Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 377 n.86 (2003) (noting the
accepted interpretation that § 1348 of 18 U.S.C. is not to be read to require the
technical elements of other securities fraud statutes); see also 148 CONG. REc. S7421
(daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (discussing the intent behind
§ 1348, which was not to "require proof of technical elements from the securities
laws," but rather to create a protection mechanism for the shareholders and
prospective shareholders of publicly traded companies that has a flexible
enforcement scheme to protect against "all the types [of] schemes and frauds [that]
inventive criminals may devise in the future").
54. See 148 CONG. REc. S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(arguing that the use of the phrase all "schemes and artifices to defraud" is broad enough
to allow prosecutors to adequately enforce the law despite future challenges to it).
55. See United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006) (noting that since the language in § 1348 was drawn from
the mail and wire fraud statutes, the court should construe § 1348 in a manner
similar to those statutes); see also Don Mayer et al., Crime and Punishment (Or the Lack
Thereoj) for FinancialFraud in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies for
Legal and EthicalLapses, 51 AM. Bus. L.J. 515, 527 (2014) (explaining that § 1348 was
modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes).
56. Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *11.
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
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requirement." A "scheme or artifice" is generally thought of in terms
of harm to the property rights of another." If the act caused
economic harm, or would have had the plan been executed, then a
scheme or artifice generally exists.' Prosecutors also have broad
leeway in connecting the scheme to a security, consistent with
similarly broad interpretations of mail and wire fraud statutes."'
C.

The Michael Coscia Indictment

On October 1, 2014, an Illinois grand jury issued the first-ever
criminal indictment for spoofing activities.12 Michael Coscia was the
manager and sole owner of Panther Energy Trading LLC, a New
Jersey-based trading firm" engaged in speculating on a wide variety
of commodities on Globex, a Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
electronic trading platform." Coscia was not new to government
58. See, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 568 (2d Cir. 2010) (requiring
"willfulness" of conduct); United Sates v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58, 59 (3d Cir. 1982)
(requiring simple recklessness to prove intent); United States v. Piepgrass, 425 F.2d
194, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1970) (requiring "specific intent to defraud"); United States v.
Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (requiring knowledge of the
action, or in the absence of knowledge, a willful or reckless disregard for the truth or
a duty to know of the falsity).
59. See, e.g., Stinn v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2012),
aff'd, 515 F. App'x 4 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirmingjury instructions defining "scheme or
artifice" as a "plan or course of action that intends some harm to the property rights
of another"). Courts have traditionally recognized two types of schemes: those that
qualify under the Stinn formulation and those that fall under the "honest services
doctrine." See id. at 537 (differentiating the type of "scheme or artifice" in the jury
instructions with that of the "honest services" doctrine); see also Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358, 408-09 (2010) (limiting liability for depriving others of honest services only
to cases involving bribes and kickbacks in a suit arising from the Enron collapse of 2001).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 98 F.3d 711, 715 (2d Cir. 1996) (implying a
potentiality-of-harm standard for § 1348 by requiring an intent to deceive and cause harm).
61. See United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (declining a
narrow construction of "scheme or artifice" in healthcare fraud cases). The court
found that the "broad language of § 1347 show[ed] that Congress intended for [the]
statute" to govern all manners of health care fraud rather than limit it to specific
types of schemes. Id.
62. Indictment, supra note 30, at 1; see Harris & Leising, supra note 17 (noting the
unprecedented nature of the criminal spoofing charges).
63. In re Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL 3817473, at *1
(July 22, 2013); see William Alden, High-Frequency Trader Charged with Manipulating
Commodity Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014, 2:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/10/02/high-frequency-trader-charged-with-manipulating-commodityprices/?r-0 (noting that Panther Energy Trading, LLC is no longer an active firm).
CME Globex, CHI. MERCANTILE EXCHANGE,
64. See Electronic Trading:
http://www.cmegroup.com/globex (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (stating that, as one
of the largest derivatives trading centers in the world, the Chicago Mercantile
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investigations or spoofing; in 2013, Panther Energy Trading LLC
settled a spoofing investigation with the CFTC for nearly one-and-ahalf million dollars in remedial sanctions. 6 5 However, a criminal
spoofing conviction presents a far more nightmarish penalty than
mere profit disgorgement 6 for civil spoofing." Coscia could face
anywhere from five to twenty-five years in prison depending on the
application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, along with millions of
dollars in fines.' Coscia's criminal indictment contains twelve counts
for six total transactions.' Each transaction has attached to it one
count of commodities fraud"o and one count of spoofing."
The indictment uses similar language to describe the transaction in
each count. For example, counts two (commodity fraud) and eight
(spoofing) concern a gold futures contract order transaction that
resulted in $560 of profit." Count two describes how Coscia
committed commodities fraud by entering into gold futures contracts
that he "caused to be programmed to quickly cancel" in order to
trade at a slightly different price from his competitors." That
language neatly overlays the language of the corresponding count eight
for spoofing, which details how Coscia "transmitted to a CMIE Group
server gold commodity futures contract orders that he intended to
cancel before execution" for ostensibly the same purpose." This kind of
Exchange Group ("CME Group") is comprised of four primary exchanges: CME,
CBOT, NYMEX, and COMEX and explaining that the Globex platform is one of the
trading portals within the CME Group).
65. In re Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL 3817473 (July
22, 2013). The final settlement was for $1,400,000 in disgorgement penalties. Id.
66. R.B. Grantham & C.E.F. Rickett, Disgorgement for Unjust Enrichment?, 62
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 159, 159 (2003) (providing that disgorgement is the process of giving
up any gain made from a wrongdoing to a claimant).
67. Compare Maria LaMagna, Panther Energy to Pay $2.8M to Settle CFTC Charges,
MARKETWATCH (July 22, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
panther-energy-to-pay-28m-to-settle-cftc-charges-201 3-07-22 (detailing civil penalties
for spoofing ranging from $1.4 million in profit disgorgement to nearly $1 million in
fines), with Henning, supra note 17 (estimating a potential prison sentence of more
than five years for a spoofing conviction).
68. See Henning, supra note 17 (noting that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
provide a sentencing floor of five years); see alo Gulino, supra note 29 (explaining
that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide a sentencing ceiling of twenty-five years,
depending on prosecutorial recommendations).
69. Indictment, supra note 30, at 1, 9-19.
70. Id. at 1, 8-13.
71. Id. at 14-19.
72. Id. at 9,15.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id. at 15.
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similarity between the corresponding counts is not uncommon in the
indictment and will be analyzed later in this Comment.7 5
D.

The Blockburger Test and DoubleJeopardyJurisprudence

Double jeopardy protection originates in the Fifth Amendment,
which provides in relevant part that "[nio person ... be subject for
the same offence [or] be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."" This
prohibition covers both successive prosecutions and multiple
punishments for the "same offense."" Though double jeopardy
analyses for multiple punishments vary, the "same elements" test is
the most widely used and accepted in a majority ofjurisdictions, while
a small minority favor the "same transaction" test." This Comment
will focus on the same elements test.
The modern same elements test derives from the Blockburgercase,79
though the underlying legal notions developed some time prior to
the decision."o The case provides that where the same actions
constitute violations of two statutes, the test to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one offense is "whether each provision

75. See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text (analyzing the content and
character of Coscia's indictment).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995) (clarifying that the
constitutional protection from double jeopardy is broader than the traditional
protection from successive prosecution).
78. See Note, Double Jeopardyand the Multiple-CountIndictment, 57 YALE L.J. 132, 134
(1947) (noting that the same transaction test asks whether the proof of one count
would sustain conviction under the other count and that the same transaction test
asks whether there exists a "common motivating intent aimed at a single ultimate
goal, ... which . . depend [s] on whether the statute prohibits the individuals acts or
the course of action which they comprise"); George C. Thomas III, The Prohibitionof
Successive Prosecutionsfor the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REV. 323,
332-34 (1986) (noting that at least four Supreme CourtJustices have advocated for a
"same transaction" test; however, the "same evidence" test has proven to be the most
popular in analyzing same offense questions); see also Witte, 515 U.S. at 396 (applying
the "same elements" test, also called the Blockburger test); United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (applying the Blockburger test).
79. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (articulating the same
elements test); see also Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696 (referencing Blockburger and applying the
same elements test in a cocaine possession case); Witte, 515 U.S. at 396 (quoting
Blockbuyerand applying the same elements test in a federal marijuana case).
80. See, e.g., Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911) (stating-over
twenty years before Blockburger-that one transaction may only satisfy two different
statutes if such statutes require different elements of proof); Morey v.
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871) (stating-over sixty years before
Blockburger-the principles of the "same elements" test).
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requires proof of a fact which the other does not.""' Blockburger
concerned a defendant convicted under a multi-count indictment of
The case involved two factual
various drug-related offenses.12
scenarios implicating double jeopardy analysis, but only the second is
relevant for the purposes of this Comment." The defendant's
indictment included multiple counts under different sections of the
Narcotic Act" connected to a single sale of morphine." The Court
had to decide whether the single transaction could constitute
multiple violations without implicating double jeopardy protection.
To do so, the Court evaluated the elements of the two statutes to
determine if one required an element of proof that the other did
not.8 ' The first violation was for selling prohibited drugs in
something other than their original packaging;" the second was for
selling them without a prescription." Without involving much
analysis, the Court decided that the provisions required sufficiently
distinct evidence so as to constitute two separate violations for the
defendant's one sale.o Though the Blockburger Court did not spend
much energy analyzing the two statutory provisions, its analysis rested
on other cases in which the Court distilled statutory elements into
their component parts to conduct a straight comparison." For
example, in Gavieres v. United States," the Court evaluated a double
81. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
82. Id. at 300-01.
83. Id. at 303-04 (affirming that multiple drug sales made to the same customer
at the same time could be charged as multiple counts in a single indictment and
evaluating the second question of whether the defendant could be convicted of
violations of different sections of the Narcotic Act based on one drug sale). This
Comment concerns only the second question.
84. Harrison Narcotic Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914), repealed by Controlled
Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C) (prohibiting the sale of narcotics without
corresponding tax paperwork).
85. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301.
86. Id. at 304.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 301.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 304.
91. See, e.g., Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911) (breaking down
the elements of two statutes to compare them: an old iteration of a public
intoxication statute and a variation of a disturbing the peace statute). The
Blockburger Court relied on Gavieres as the foundation for its now-famous mandate to
compare statutory elements when determining whether unitary conduct in violation
of two statutes constitutes two offenses or one. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
92. 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
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jeopardy challenge stemming from the defendant's conviction for
insulting or threatening a public official and for public intoxication
or indecency." To begin its analysis, the Court converted the
statutory language of the ordinances into simple elements to use for
straight comparison." Upon comparing the distilled language of the
statutes, the Court determined that they created two, separately
punishable offenses because threatening a public official is a superfluous
element not required to prove public intoxication and indecency."
Nearly forty years after the Blockburger decision, the Supreme Court
decided Whalen v. United States," one of several important cases
elaborating further on the application of the Blockburger test." In
Whalen, the defendant was convicted of both felony murder and
rape." The District of Columbia felony murder statute defined the
crime as the killing of a human in the course of any of six specified
felonies, including rape, among others." The lower court found
against the defendant on the merits of his merger doctrine' 00
argument, leading to his constitutional challenge under a theory of
0
double jeopardy.o'
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting
the lack of legislative history available to help define certain portions
of the statutes.'o2 In the absence of such history, which might have
93. See id. at 340-41 (noting that the first statute applied to "those who outrage,
insult, or threaten, by deed or word, public officials or agents of the authorities, in
their presence, or in a writing addressed to them," and the second prohibited being
"drunk or intoxicated or behav[ing] in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent
manner in any public place open to public view").
94. See id. at 342 (reducing the public intoxication statute to the "gist" of its
components).
95. Id. at 343-44 (finding that evidence sufficient for a public intoxication
conviction would not be sufficient for an insulting a public official conviction).

96.

445 U.S. 684 (1980).

97. See id. at 694 (developing the application of the rule of lenity where Congress
fails to specify whether multiple punishments are warranted for one offense that
violates two different statutes); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985)
(determining the rules for Blockburger application in the case of "compound" statutes,
meaning statutes with elements that incorporate other statutes). But see Albernaz v.
United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (rejecting in part the Whalen implementation
of the rule of lenity in cases where Congress is silent on the applicability of two
statutes to the same conduct).
98. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 685.

99.

Id. at 686.

100. See id. (explaining that the defendant argued in the lower court that his
commission of rape merged into the crime of felony murder once the killing took place).

101.

Id.at687.

102. See id. at 690 (explaining that the legislative history "sheds no light on th[e]
question" of whether Congress intended consecutive sentences when both statutes
are implicated); George C. Thomas III, A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment, 47 U.
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led to a presumption of leniency or harshness, the Court held that
the two convictions failed the Blockburger test because they did not
clearly require different elements of proof.103 Importantly, the Court
in Whalen resolved the issue of congressional silence on whether the
statutes could be punishable together or separately with leniency
towards the defendant.'o The Court's later decision in Albernaz v.
United States,' 5 in which the Court refused to apply the rule of lenity
where the statute was unambiguous and the legislative history did not
cause the Court to pause, 06 created tension with this determination.
The final seminal case in this corner of double jeopardy
jurisprudence is Ball v. United States.o' In Ball, the defendant was
convicted of violating two firearm statutes, one that prohibited
receiving a firearm in interstate commerce and another prohibiting
the receipt, transportation, or possession of a firearm in interstate
commerce.' The defendant was convicted of both and sentenced to
successive jail sentences.0 " The Ball Court seemingly rejected the
threshold question offered in Albernaz regarding the effect of
congressional silence on the application of the rule of lenity."o In this
manner, the Ball Court did not first analyze congressional silence on the
application of the two firearm statutes with a presumption favoring the
defendant; the Court instead used the Blockburgertest as the first mode of
analysis."' Importantly, the Ball Court further developed the Blockburger
test by applying it to two different compound statutes."'
The Blockburger, Whalen, and Ball cases comprise a substantial
amount of modern double jeopardy jurisprudence specific to
Prrr. L. REv. 1, 78 (1985) (referencing the Whalen quotation regarding the legislative

history of statutory construction of the statutes at issue).
103. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 693-94 (finding that the added required element of a
killing for a felony murder conviction did not sufficiently differentiate the charges so
as to fail the Blockburger test).
104. Id. at 694.
105. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
106. Id. at 342-43.
107. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
108. Id. at 857.
109. See id. at 857-58 (sentencing Ball to three years for the receipt of the firearm
followed by two years for the possession of the firearm).
110. See id. at 861 (applying Blockburgerwithout first using the Albernaz framework
to say that congressional silence on the application of statutes should be read as
precluding two convictions for the same conduct).
111. Id.at862.
112. See Thomas III, supra note 102, at 85 (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.
684 (1980)) (explaining that compound statutes are formed when a predicate
offense morphs into a different offense after an additional element is introduced).
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multiple punishment questions." 3 Those three cases, taken together
with Gavieres, form a workable framework within which to evaluate
statutes for double jeopardy questions."'
This framework is
incomplete, however, without an understanding of some of the
canons of statutory construction that provide context for the analysis.
E.

Lex Generalis, MergerDoctrine, and the Rule of Lenity

Canons of construction are guides meant to help courts
understand the meaning of legislation." 5 Three canons help to
illustrate the legal theorem relevant to the Blockburger decision. The
first canon is lex specialis derogat lex generalis, meaning specialized laws
prevail over general laws."' For example, a statute specifically
governing bank robbery will supersede a more generic robbery statute
when indicting a bank robber." 7 Applying this canon necessitates an
understanding of the policy underlying the statutes to decide whether
construing one at the expense of the other is appropriate and whether
it keeps in line with the larger statutory regime."'
The second important canon of construction is the merger
doctrine. The merger doctrine holds that, absent clear evidence to
the contrary, where one offense merges into another during
commission of a crime, the later offense should consume the former
in an indictment."' The purpose of merger is to ensure that
113. See supra notes 78-112 and accompanying text (tracing the developments in
double jeopardy theory).
114. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (completing the framework by
adding the preliminary analysis focusing on simplifying the statutory elements into
their basic components).
115. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (referring to canons of
constructions as "simply 'rules of thumb' which will sometimes help courts [to
divine] the meaning of legislation" (citing Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253 (1992))).
116. See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) (phrasing the maxim as "the
more specific treatment prevails over the general" (citing United States v. Lara, 181
F.3d 183, 198 (1st Cir. 1999))); see also Kirchheimer, supra note 36, at 517 (showing
common uses of the lex specialis doctrine, such as convicting under the specific bank
robbery statute instead of under the more general robbery statute).
117. See Kirchheimer, supra note 36, at 517-18 (noting that the same canon governs the
relationship between larceny and robbery; intoxication on a public highway and driving on
a public highway while intoxicated; and certain lesser-included offenses).
118. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 511 (requiring an understanding of the policy behind
the statutes in question, obtained through using canons of construction, so as to allow a
meaningful comparison to determine the substantive limitations in application of each).
119. See Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957) (merging two distinct statutory
violations into one based on the absence of evidence of congressional intent to the
contrary); see also Kirchheimer, supra note 36, at 518 (advocating a "consumption" principle,
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overlapping statutes are applied in an orderly regime, with
meaningful distinctions as to when statutes should be read as both
applicable or as mutually exclusive.1 20 Major authority for this
proposition comes from Prince v. United States.' 2 1 In Prince, the
Supreme Court decided whether the crime of entering a bank with
the intent to commit a robbery merges with the crime of bank
robbery once the robbery is committed.' 22 The defendant in Prince
robbed a Malone, Texas bank with a revolver and was later
A grand jury issued a two-count indictment,
apprehended.' 2 '
charging him with one count of robbery and one count of entering
the bank with the intent to commit a felony.' 2" He was convicted on
both counts and was to serve, consecutively, twenty years for the
robbery and fifteen years for entering.'12
The Court determined that, absent congressional intent or
legislative history to the contrary, the unlawful entry provision was
inserted to cover factual scenarios in which a defendant entered a
bank with the intent to rob it, but, for whatever reason, failed to
The Court surmised that the two
accomplish his illicit aims.22
punishments were supposed to work side-by-side to ensure
application across all factual scenarios, rather than stack atop each
other for every basic bank robbery.'12 To reach that conclusion, the
Court used the merger canon to evaluate the gravamen of both
offenses and discovered that it remained constant for both.'2 ' Although
one crime focused on the entry and the other on the act of robbery, the

whereby a preliminary criminal act is consumed by future acts in service of the same crime,
such as conspiracy to commit a crime and the consummated crime).
120. See Prince, 352 U.S. at 327-28 (attributing the Court's merger analysis to the
need to preserve an orderly interpretation of criminal statutes).

121.

352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957).

122. Id. However, it is important to note that the Court specifically stated that its
holding in the case was to be narrowed to the statute at issue and not expanded to cases
at large involving "fragmentation of crimes for the purposes of punishment." Id. at 325.
123. Id. at 324.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 328.
127. Id. at 327 (rejecting the government's request to interpret the statute as
amended as making each offense independent). The Court in this case was
attempting to reconstruct an enforcement regime by applying sparse congressional
intent. The result was a finding that Congress intended to establish lesser offenses,
but that it did not intend to stack the penalties. Id. The finding was based on the
fact that the Attorney General's letter to Congress only stressed the "possibility that a
thief might not commit all of the elements of the crime of robbery." Id.
128. Id. at 328.
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Court found that the most significant element of both crimes was the
intent to steal.129 In this manner, the "merger" of the intent to rob and
the act of robbing shows the Court's interpretation of how Congress
intended the bank robbery statutory scheme to function.3 o The Prince
use of the merger doctrine is distinct from the now-outdated common
law principle of merger."'
The Prince use functions more like a
supplementary analysis to the Blockburger test, extending double jeopardy
protections from simply a strict comparison of elements to also include
an examination of congressional intent.'
The Prince Court proceeded with its double jeopardy analysis
through the lens of another canon of construction: the rule of
lenity.'" The rule of lenity invokes similar themes to the merger
theory in that it only operates in the absence of congressional intent
to guide the court."'
In such a case, the rule of lenity is a
presumption against the more severe punishment that could be
possibly attributed in the reading of an unclear statute.' 3 5 The Prince
Court interpreted this rule as an inherent limitation on multiple
punishments, attributing to Congress the presumption of lenity
absent clear legislative evidence to the contrary.3 3
The Court's
treatment of this maxim as a guiding principle in the absence of clear
legislative intent is critical to the double jeopardy analysis because the
only time a court engages in substantive analysis is when the
threshold requirement of no legislative intent is first met. 3 1
129. Id. (declining to go beyond the given analysis because it would compel a
finding that Congress intended to make drastic changes in authorized punishments).
130. See id. (merging the intent to rob with the act of robbing to differentiate
statutes Congress intended to stack with those Congress intended to complement).
131. See Thomas III, supra note 102, at 40-41 (theorizing that the Prince Court's
use of the merger doctrine was more of a shorthand used to describe a "merger" of
offenses when one crime violated two statutes and where congressional intent is
clear, rather than an expression of the common law doctrine); see also Callanan v.
United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1961) (declaring with finality the abandonment
of common law merger in modern jurisprudence).
132. See Thomas III, supra note 102, at 37-39 (claiming the Prince case as the
Supreme Court's realization that a strict Blockburranalysis provided too little protection
against double jeopardy to defendants); see also Prince, 352 U.S. at 325 (prefacing a
traditional Blockburgeranalysis with an evaluation of congressional intent).
133. Prince, 352 U.S. at 329 (applying criminal penalties with leniency towards the
defendant if doing so is consistent with "pertinent legislative history").
134. Id. (emphasizing the necessary condition of a lack of clear congressional intent).
135. See id. (noting the Court's policy of not attributing to Congress an intention
to punish more severely than the statute's clear language).

136.

Id.

137. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (explaining double jeopardy's
threshold question of whether there is clear legislative intent to enforce multiple or
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The theories of lex generalis, merger, and lenity are not binding
rules; rather, they are guiding principles to help broaden and
enhance understanding of statutory language and intent.13
However, they do carry substantial weight in interpreting vague
statutes or statutes in which the underlying congressional intent is
unclear.'"3 As such, this Comment will treat them as supplementary
in nature, aiding in the main comparative elements analysis below.
II. A CRIMINAL INDICTMENT FOR BOTH SPOOFING AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD FOR THE SAME TRANSACTION IMPLICATES DOUBLEJEOPARDY

If proving a spoofing violation always proves a commodities fraud
violation, or vice versa, then the Blockburger test would reveal a
presumption that the legislature intended not to create two separate
offenses, but instead that it intended to create alternative statutory
grounds for punishment.' The first step in the Blockburgeranalysis is
distilling the statutory elements into usable component parts, as per
the Gavieres requirement."' The statutes at issue in Gavieres were
fairly straightforward,' 4 2 unlike the spoofing and commodities fraud
statutes. As such, the Gavieres analysis that follows is substantially
more in depth to discern the true meaning of those statutes.
A.

Spoofing and Commodities FraudUnder the Gavieres Mandate

The spoofing statute itself is largely unhelpful in providing a
workable plain meaning. It reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any trading,
practice, or conduct on or subject to the rules of a registered entity
that ...

is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the

singular infractions).

138.

See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (reiterating the guiding,

rather than binding, nature of canons of construction).
139. See Prince, 352 U.S. at 328 (implying that some canons of construction require
an absence of congressional intent as an operative condition).
140. See Thomas III, supra note 102, at 76 (proposing that, in the absence of clear
evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, if the elements of one crime
necessarily prove another, then it is presumed that Congress did not intend for both
statutes to govern the same conduct).
141. See Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911) (explaining the legal
foundations for the Blockburger test, including the preliminary analysis of breaking
down statutory elements into more usable parts). This Comment will refer to the
preliminary statutory analysis recommended by the court as the "Gavieres Mandate."
142. See id. (referencing the relatively short length and simple language at issue
with the statutes in the case).
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trade as, "spoofing" (bidding or offering with the intent to cancel
the bid or offer before execution)."
Taking the elements in order, the first ambiguity is what it means
to be engaged in any trade, practice, or conduct subject to the rules
Registered entities are generally market
of a registered entity.
oversight and organizational authorities that register with the CFTC
to promulgate rules and regulations that govern their memberparticipants."' These entities include designated contract markets,"
swap execution facilities,"' derivatives clearing organizations,"' and
The CFTC heavily relies on these
swap data repositories. 148
organizations as industry self-regulators to submit and enforce rules
to govern their members."' 9 The spoofing statute applies to any
trader operating on one of these entities, but, for the sake of
simplicity, we will simply call them "market participants."`0

143.

7U.S.C.§6c(a)(5)(C) (2012).

See Rules and Rule Amendments, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/ruleamendments/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (illustrating that registered entities are essential to
maintaining market integrity and protecting the consumer through drafting and
implementing smart and effective rules to help self-regulate).
145. See Designated Contract Markets, U.S. COMMODrTY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/
index.htm (last visited Oct 26, 2015) (describing designated contract markets ("DCMs")
as boards of trade or exchanges based on an underlying commodity or index).
146. See Swap Execution Facilities, U.S. COMMODrv FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/SEF2/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (explaining that swap execution facilities ("SEFs")
function like trading platforms and help maintain pre-swap price transparency and
orderly market orientation by providing pre-trade information, such as bids, offers,
and methods of execution, to its participants).
147. See Derivatives Clearing Organizations, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/ClearingOrganizations/
index.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (demonstrating that derivatives clearing
organizations ("DCOs") are entities that facilitate mutualization of credit risk among
participants through contracted credit swaps, allowing participants to substitute the
credit of the DCO for their own credit and to settle outstanding obligations).
148. See Data Repositories, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/datarepositories/index.htm (last visited Oct.
26, 2015) (defining swap data repositories ("SDRs") as entities that provide
centralized facilities for swap data recordkeeping and reporting).
149. See Rules and Rule Amendments, supra note 144 (reiterating the role of
registered entities in promoting and maintaining orderly market functionality, as
well as supplementing regulators in market oversight).
150. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed
Mar. 18, 2011) (referring to traders eligible for regulation under the spoofing statute
as "market participants").
144.

COMMISSION,
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The next element for interpretation is what actions are, are of the
character of, or are commonly known to the trade as spoofing. The
CFTC released guidance in March 2011 that sheds some light on this
section.' 5 ' The CFTC's spoofing definition enumerates specific
actions that qualify as spoofing, but connects them under a central
theme.'5 2 Specifically, spoofing can include, but is not limited to:
"(i) [s]ubmitting or cancelling bids or offers to overload the
quotation system of a registered entity[;] (ii) submitting or cancelling
bids or offers to delay another person's execution of trades; and (iii)
submitting or cancelling multiple bids or offers to create an
appearance of false market depth."'
Although when taken
separately these actions cover fragmented illicit trading strategies,
together they reveal the CFTC's aim of regulating specifically the
practice of entering into trades with the intent to cancel; in other
words, to regulate only illicit trading behavior. 5 4
The Agency itself has explicitly revealed this goal through its
promulgation and reiteration of an intent requirement. 155 In the 2011
guidance, the agency declared that "a market participant must act with
some degree of intent, or scienter" and that, therefore, "reckless trading,
conduct, or practices will not result in violations."15 1 Limiting the scope of
the spoofing statute to preserve legitimate trading was clearly an
important goal to the Agency, as it was a central conversation topic in the
Agency's talks with industry representatives before releasing the
guidance.5 5
This goal, combined with the enumerated and broad
examples in the guidance, provides a starting point for interpreting the
statute. However, the next portion of the statute draws a spoofing
definition from the industry's definition of the term."'
151. See id. This guidance released by the CFTC is the most helpful source of
information on the Commission's priorities with regards to prosecuting spoofing. It
elaborates not only on some definitional issues surrounding spoofing enforcement,
but also on the scope and nature of the spoofing provisions themselves. Id.
152. See id. (connecting the enumerated actions under the common theme of
entering into bids with the intent to cancel).
153. Id.
154. See id. (noting that by stressing "intent," the Commission does not intend to
cover reckless trading, conduct, or practices in the definition of spoofing).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. (reiterating the Commission's goal of limiting spoofing violations to
actions with a provable scienter element so as to exempt innocent trading and noting
that the guidance was influenced in large part by a noticeable industry concern for
preserving honest trading activity).
158. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (5) (C) (2012) (criminalizing trading, practice, or conduct
that "is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, 'spoofing"')
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Spoofing has a murky and controversial definition within the
commodities trading industry.159
Even beyond the lack of an
agreeable definition of spoofing, some industry insiders have
difficulty deciphering other parts of the statute.`0 For example, one
of the industry representatives at the CFTC roundtable discussion
leading up to the guidance publication asked the group why the
statute differentiated "practice" and "conduct" from trading, noting
that the obscure language made it difficult to comfortably take a
position on the legitimacy of certain trades."'
Others in the
roundtable took issue not with the lack of a definition of spoofing,
but with the multitude of definitions.'
The CFTC incorporated
these concerns when drafting their guidance, and produced
regulations that make an effort to distinguish spoofing from
legitimate trading activity.'
In fact, the Agency provided increased
protection to traders by adding in a good faith defense clause,
reflecting industry concerns that good faith trading might still
technically qualify as spoofing.' 6 As such, the elements of spoofing
may be fairly reduced to two: (1) the common theme of entering orders
with the intent to cancel; and (2) an intent to cancel in bad faith with no
legitimate underlying business reason. 6 5 These new elements satisfy the
(emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., Roundtable, supra note 42, at 82 (statement of John Lothian,
John J. Lothian & Company) (noting that spoofing is "a very undefined type of a
term within the industry").
160. Id. at 59.
161. Id. at 59-60.
162. See id. at 64 (statement of Gary DeWaal, Newedge USA, LLC) ("I'm not sure
of [sic] the definition of spoofing can be agreed upon by the ten people around this
table."); id. at 82 (statement ofJohn Lothian, John J. Lothian & Company) (" [I]t's a
very undefined type of a term within the industry."); id. at 111 (statement of Adam
Nunes, Hudson River Trading Group) ("[T]here's a fundamental question which is,
if you're putting orders out that are taking risk, can you be defined as spoofing?").
163. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed Mar. 18,
2011) (emphasizing that the spoofing guidance only applies to illegitimate trading).
164. See Roundtable, supra note 42, at 35 (statement of Raj Fernando, Chopper
Trading, LLC) (explaining that a trader can enter a bid with the intent to cancel it to
legitimately test risk procedures); see also Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG.
at 14,947 (clarifying that orders would not be considered spoofing if they were "part
of a legitimate, good-faith attempt to consummate a trade").
165. Whether referring to broad rules or specific examples, the CFTC guidance
and codified statute consistently cite the need for orders to be entered with the
intent to cancel. See, e.g., Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947. The
good faith trading exception appears to reflect industry concerns that the rule might
have ill-effects without distinguishing manipulative, bad-faith cancellations from
regular cancellations. See, e.g., Roundtable, supra note 42, at 21 (statement of Adam
Nunes, Hudson River Trading Group) (demonstrating how spoofing can be fairly
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first half of the required Gavieres analysis as a preliminary step in the
larger Blockburger test.'" What follows is the same application of Gavieres
to distill the commodities fraud statute for comparison.
Securities fraud regulation passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002."'
In 2009, the Act was amended to include
commodities as well.'" The Act proscribes a fine and/or twentyfive year penalty for anyone who:
knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice ...
(1) to defraud any person in connection with any commodity for
future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future delivery,
or any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... or (2)
to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, any money or property in connection
with the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery, or
any option on a commodity for future delivery, or any security of
an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. ...
Mechanically speaking, the commodities fraud statute has three
elements: (1) a fraudulent intent; (2) a scheme or artifice; and (3) a
connection to a security or commodity.17 o The statute requires the
fraudulent intent to rise to the level of "knowing.""' The statute's
legislative history indicates that the intent provision is supposed to
mirror that of the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes.' 7 2 Since the

said to require manipulative intent and describing how many view spoofing as a smaller
subset of broader issues of market manipulation). The Agency clearly shares those
concerns, as it repeatedly stated in the guidance that its goal was to only regulate bad-faith
trading. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947 (explaining that the
guidance was meant to target illicit behavior and preserve legitimate trading).
166. See Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911) (referencing the
reduced elements of each statute in simplified language).
167. Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2012) (analyzing
these three elements of commodities fraud in the context of insider trading); United
States v. Motz, 652 F. Supp. 2d 284, 289, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (undertaking the same
analysis to evaluate a "cherry-picking" scheme, whereby a broker executes trades but
leaves them without an assigned account until the securities either appreciate or
depreciate during the trading day).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
172. See S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 20 (2002) (reiterating the Senate's will to apply the
intent requirement consistently with the intent requirements in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343-44, 1347). The section numbers indicated in the Senate Report correspond to
the mail, wire, bank, and health care fraud statutes, respectively. See Luke A. E.
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language tracks that of other fraud statutes, the intent element can
be explained in a similar manner. 7 ' As with the accompanying fraud
statutes, § 1348 intent generally requires a showing that the
defendant had a "conscious knowing intent to defraud.""'
This
scienter standard separates simply reckless behavior from behavior
that the defendant knows is fraudulent and harmful."' The harm
component by definition excludes mere misrepresentations as
satisfactory on their own, but in most cases, the intent can be inferred
as the "necessary result" of the scheme itself."'
The second element of the statute is a "scheme or artifice" used to
defraud. "' The term "scheme or artifice" carries with it a
connotation of deceit and illegitimacy, and it is construed as such in
the corresponding fraud statutes."' Courts have used the term to
serve as a stark distinction from legitimate activity, keeping in line
with the statutory aim of protecting innocent behavior."' This
statutory aim is one of the only legislated guiding principles that limit
the scope of what exactly a "scheme or artifice" is, as Congress failed
to define the term in the statute.8 0 As such, courts have shouldered
Pazicky, Note, A New Arrow in the Quiver of Federal Securities Fraud Prosecutors: Section

807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1348), 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 801, 811-12
(2003) (noting that the application of the intent requirement is supposed to mirror
the intent requirement found in the mail, wire, bank, and health care fraud statutes).
173. S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 20.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, Criminal No. 3:11-cr-192 (JCH), 2014 WL
3565957, at *5 (D. Conn. July 18, 2014) (interpreting the wire fraud statute to
require a "conscious knowing intent to defraud" (quoting United States v. Autuori,
212 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2000))).
175. See Autuori, 212 F.3d at 116 ("Essential to a scheme to defraud is fraudulent
intent." (citing United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994))); see also
United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A] defendant acts with
a[n] ... intent to defraud if he participates in the fraudulent scheme with some
realization of its fraudulent or deceptive character and with recognition of its capacity
to cause harm to the victims of such deception.").
176. See Horman v. United States, 116 F. 350, 352-53 (6th Cir. 1902) (finding that
a scheme to defraud and defame investors necessarily involved harming the victims,
and that, therefore, it automatically satisfied the scienter requirement).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012).
178. See, e.g., Horman, 116 F. 350 at 352 (construing "scheme or artifice" in mail
fraud cases against the backdrop of the underlying purpose to preserve legitimate
uses of the postal service).
179. See id. (observing that guilty intent is proven "when the act is proved to have
been knowingly committed" (quoting United States v. Taintor, 28 F. Cas. 7, 9
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 16,428))).
180. See United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing the
"sparse" guiding legislative history accompanying § 1341 to reveal "only one clearly
articulated purpose: to prevent the use of the mails in furtherance of fraudulent
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the responsibility to clarify the definition.'"' Though there are many
nuances and facets to interpreting a scheme or artifice, courts
generally identify such schemes by connecting them to the fraudulent
intent, thereby ensuring that they are only capturing schemes that
required planning and the intent to defraud.' 2
The third element is a connection to a commodity.'
There is
virtually no limit on the range of victims that a scheme must touch for
it to be "in connection with [a] security."'
Conceivably, this
connection could even be established between two computers engaged
in algorithmic trading so long as the software was programmed to derive
a benefit from the trading activity. This interpretation of establishing
connections through the pursuit of gain is firmly rooted in Supreme
Court jurisprudence."' This broad interpretation is consistent not only
with the broad nature of the preceding elements, but also with the
intent of the statute's drafters.

6

As such, the elements of commodities fraud may be more simply
stated as: (1) a fraudulent intent to knowingly and harmfully deceive
(2) through the use of a scheme or artifice furthering the fraudulent
intent (3) in connection with a commodity. Now that the elements of
both spoofing and commodities fraud have been reduced to their
plain meaning per the Gavieres mandate, the next step in the
Blockburger test will compare the distilled elements to show that proof
of spoofing will always constitute proof of commodities fraud.
B.

A Comparisonof the Spoofing and CommoditiesFraudElements PostGavieres Fails the Blockburger Sameness Test

In a multi-count indictment, where the proof of one offense
necessarily proves another offense in its entirety, the Blockburger test
enterprises"); see also United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1976)
(decrying the lack of parameters established to define "scheme or artifice").
181. See McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1248 (recapping the role courts have had in supplementing
sparse legislative history to discern the purpose and reach of the statute).
182. See, e.g., id. (establishing that schemes intended to defraud individuals fall
under the mail fraud statute); United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir.
1974) (imputing an element of planning or pattern into the concept of a "scheme").
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012).
184. Id.; see United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR -613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *12
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that the phrase "in connection with" has such a broad
definition that it does not even concern the status of the victim).
185. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 666, 678 (1997) (finding that the
defendant committed fraud "in connection with" securities when he stole
confidential information for personal gain).
186. See 148 CONG. REc. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(extolling the virtues of the statute's broad scope).
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will prohibit punishment for both offenses."' Though Blockburgerhas
never been used to evaluate the spoofing and commodities fraud
statutes, the Supreme Court used it to examine firearm receipt and
firearm possession statutes in Ball v. United States.'88
It is this analysis-that committing one offense necessarily
involves total proof of the other-that shows why spoofing and
commodities fraud may be incompatible on the same indictment.
Committing "spoofing" necessarily involves the commission of
commodities fraud. This proposition does not hold true when
reversed, as commodities fraud can involve the commission of a
fraud more general than the specific schemes or artifices articulated
in the spoofing statute.' However, spoofing appears to function as
more of a specific subset of larger manipulation.'"0
This theory holds when comparing the distilled elements of the
two statutes side-by-side. When committing a spoofing violation, a
defendant must: (1) enter orders with the intent to cancel, and (2)
the intent to cancel must be in bad faith with no legitimate
underlying business reason.'" For the purposes of illustrating a
187. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see Ball v. United
States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985) (applying Blockburger to analyze two statutes, one for
firearm receipt and one for firearm possession). Ball, Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684 (1980), and Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), constitute the
main body of double jeopardy jurisprudence in this area.
188. Recall that in Ball, the defendant was convicted on violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(h) (1) and § 924(a), receiving and possessing a firearm shipped in interstate
commerce. Ball 470 U.S. at 857. The Court noted that the Blockburger inquiry is
whether one offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, as
Congress does not ordinarily intend to punish the same offense twice. Id. at 861.
189. CompareDisruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed
Mar. 18, 2011) (decreeing that spoofing requires the specific action of entering a bid
with the intent to cancel before execution), with United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d
1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1976) (describing the absence of congressionally established
parameters defining "scheme or artifice" with regards to mail fraud). Also note that
the mere fact that the elements of commodities fraud can be met by other actions besides
spoofing does not automatically mean that the two statutes pass the Blocburger test. See
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 694 (rejecting the government's contention that felony murder and
rape charges should be separately punishable because felony murder can be satisfied by the
killing of a person during the commission of other felonies besides rape).
190. See Roundtable, supra note 42, at 92 (statement of Adam Nunes, Hudson
River Trading Group) (explaining that "spoofing" is one narrow aspect of the larger
crime of manipulating the market); id. at 21 (stressing that there are rules "against
submitting orders or quotes . .. with the intent of.. . effectively manipulatingothers to
act in a way that they otherwise wouldn't" (emphasis added)).
191. See supra notes 143-66 and accompanying text (simplifying the elements of
spoofing and commodities fraud as done with different elements in Gavieres v.
United States, 220 U.S. 338, 343 (1911)).
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"typical" spoofing violation, we will examine one of the spoofing
counts in the Coscia indictment.'12 Coscia is accused of manipulating
market prices through a carefully staged number of buy and sell
orders and of exploiting the slight movement to make small profits.'"
The indictment alleges that he entered into preliminary buy orders,
then artificially depressed market prices for those orders by putting
out large sell orders."' Coscia then filled his buy orders and raised
prices past their original level by cancelling his large sell orders.'
Coscia then finished the series by selling the orders he purchased at
the higher price that he allegedly created."'
Coscia's alleged spoofing operation and the more general CFTC
spoofing guidance provide working models to compare with
commodities fraud. First, the spoofing element of entering orders
with the intent to cancel them will always satisfy the commodities
fraud element of using a scheme or artifice to achieve an illicit end.'
To qualify as spoofing, the participant must enter orders with the
intent to cancel them as part of a bad faith effort unrelated to any
legitimate business purpose.'"9 This requirement manifests in the
CFTC's grant of a good faith trading defense so as to limit its
regulation to only cover illicit activity.'" As such, the spoofing activity
must be perpetrated to reach an illicit end.2 00 Because of this
requirement, spoofing techniques will always be a "scheme or
artifice" for the purposes of commodities fraud.'o A scheme or
artifice under § 1348 has a distinct connotation implying deceit and
illegitimacy. 202 This connotation manifests not only in a clear
192. There is no precedent examining the elements of spoofing, so Coscia's
indictment will suffice for the purposes of this Comment See Indictment, supra note 30,
at 6-7 (alleging that Coscia placed sell orders to drive down prices, filled buy orders, then
cancelled the sell orders to let prices rise, and resold the filled buy orders at a profit).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 6.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 6-7.
197. United States v. Coscia, No. 14 CR 551, 2015 WL 1805955, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 16, 2015) (holding that, in this case, creating a false impression satisfies the
"scheme or artifice" element of commodities fraud).
198. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed
Mar. 18, 2011) (providing a good faith cancellation defense so as to differentiate
legitimate trading activity).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012) (requiring a scheme or artifice to trip the
statute).
202. United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000).
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congressional attempt to distinguish activities as part of a scheme or
artifice from legitimate trading activity, but also in how the courts
determine what kinds of set-ups qualify.20 s As such, every spoofed
trade entered into with the bad faith intent to cancel before
execution that would fall outside of the good faith trading defense
provided in the CFTC guidance20 would also satisfy the § 1348
scheme and artifice requirement of servicing an illegitimate or
deceitful goal.20 Both the spoofing and commodities fraud statutes
explicitly attempt to limit their scope to only illegitimate trading
behavior in the same manner; so, impermissible behavior under the
former also qualifies as such under the latter.206
Furthermore, the fact that the intent to cancel must be present at
the time the trade was entered to trigger the spoofing statute also
implicates the court-developed notion that schemes and artifices for
commodities fraud usually involve a degree of planning to evince
intent. 20' By definition, spoofing requires planning because it is a
two-step process: the spoofer has to first enter into, and subsequently
cancel, the trades.20 8 If this process does not happen with the
requisite precision, the cancelled trades will not shift the market, and
the spoofer will derive no benefit and cause no harm.209
Spoofing also satisfies the intent required to commit commodities
fraud. 2 0 Both statutes require scienter on behalf of the defendant to
203. Id.; see Horman v. United States, 116 F. 350, 352 (6th Cir. 1902) (attempting
to protect innocent behavior while regulating illicit actions).
204. Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed
Mar. 18, 2011).
205. See, e.g., Horman, 116 F. at 352 (interpreting the scheme or artifice
requirement broadly to include attempts to injure another).
206. Compare id. ("The phrase 'scheme or artifice to defraud' is to be construed
bearing in mind the underlying purpose of the statute to preserve the use of the mails
to legitimate ends."), with Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947
("Furthermore, orders, modifications, or cancellations will not be classified as
'spoofing' if they were submitted as part of a legitimate, good-faith attempt to
consummate a trade.").
207. Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947.

208.

Id.

209. Michael Coscia, on the other hand, is accused of perpetrating successful
spoofing. See Indictment, supra note 30, at 6 (describing Coscia's spoofing actions of
successfully entering into and cancelling trades to make a profit).
210. The commodities fraud statute requires the defendant to "knowingly"
commit the fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012). Previously discussed case law interprets
this standard to mirror that of the wire fraud statute, which requires a conscious
United States v. Kelly, Criminal No. 3:11-cr-192, 2014 WL
intent to defraud.
3565957, at *5 (D. Conn. July 18, 2014). The spoofing statute does not specify what
intent would qualify, but the intent can be inferred from the CFTC guidance's
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separate intentional behavior from reckless behavior.2 1 1 The scienter
requirement for spoofing necessitates trading in bad faith,212 which
appears to be akin to market deception.2 S The scienter requirement
for commodities fraud necessitates intentional deception with the
intent to harm the victims. 21'

A spoofer will always act with the requisite

intent for commodities fraud because spoofing can only work through
deceptive trading and is always done to the detriment of other traders.'"
Courts have consistently upheld that when the necessary result of a
scheme or artifice is to injure others, the requisite intent can be inferred
simply from the defendant's execution of the scheme."' Such is the
case with spoofing: the trades are not made in a vacuum--spoofed
trades harm anyone relying on those trades as good faith
representations of actual buy-and-sell orders. 217
When compared side-by-side, the elements of spoofing appear to
overlay the elements of commodities fraud. Thus, a defendant who
commits a true spoofing transaction will always also commit
commodities fraud, even if the reverse is not true."' This situation is
similar to that which the Court faced in Ball.2 " Though the Court
emphasis on preserving good faith trading. See 7 U.S.C. §6c(a)(5)(C) (2012)
(lacking "knowing," or any other operative intent standard); see also Disruptive
Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947 (restating the Commission's priorities
with regards to good faith trading).
211. Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. at 14,947.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 17 (describing spoofing as a form of market
manipulation); Roundtable, supra note 42, at 6 (identifying spoofing as a subset of
broader market manipulation).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring an
intent to harm because the more inclusive standard of simply recognizing the
possibility of harm could ensnare innocent bystanders).
215. See Henning, supra note 17 (describing how spoofed trades manipulate traders into
disadvantageous positions, thereby reaping profit at the expense of other participants).
216. United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) ("When the
'necessary result' of the actor's scheme is to injure others, fraudulent intent may be
inferred from the scheme itself."); United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421
F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970) ("Although proof that the injury was accomplished is
not required, . . . we believe the statute does require evidence from which it may be
inferred that some actual injury to the victim .. . is a reasonably probable result of
the deceitful representations if they are successful.").
217. See Henning, supra note 17 (explaining how, given the automated nature of a
substantial percentage of U.S. trading activity, spoofed trades affect the calculations
of other trading computers, resulting in rapid market movement).
218. See supra notes 189-217 and accompanying text (comparing the elements of
spoofing to the elements of commodities fraud to show that proof of spoofing will
always prove commodities fraud).
219. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 857 (1985) (determining whether the
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was content to merely state the proposition that gun receipt
necessitates possession and that, therefore, a defendant could not be
convicted of both,220 the underlying inquiry is the same: "whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."22
Applying this test to spoofing and commodities fraud, it is clear that
proof of spoofing by definition proves commodities fraud; therefore,
the Blockburger test constitutionally precludes convicting and
sentencing a defendant with both violations for a single transaction.2 22
C. The Canons ofLex Specialis Derogat Lex Generalis and Merger
DoctrineShow How Spoofing Operates as a MechanicalSubset of Commodities
Fraud, RatherThan as a Different Act
Though the Blockburger test has become a bedrock principle in
multiple-punishment jurisprudence," it may be helpful to explore
some canons of statutory construction so as to further illuminate the
underlying principles. One such maxim is lex specialis derogat lex
This
generalis, or, specialized laws prevail over general laws.2 "
principle is most often seen when dealing with two provisions in the
same enactment.22 ' However, it may also be used to construe statutes
that are "interrelated and closely positioned."2 2 '

Though spoofing

and commodities fraud are not closely positioned within the United
offense of firearm receipt necessarily includes the offense of firearm possession).
220. Id. at 862.
221. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
222. See id. at 304 (holding that if the same conduct is used to prove violation of
two different statutory provisions using the same elements, the defendant may only
be prosecuted and punished under one statute).
223. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 861 (noting that the Court has "consistently" relied
on the Blockburgertest).
224. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 507-08 (1996) (authorizing a
lawsuit for individual relief under specialized employment benefits law rather than
under a broader statute); In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) ("In statutory
construction, the more specific treatment prevails over the general."); Diaz v. Cobb,
435 F. Supp. 2d. 1206, 1216 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (dismissing a lawsuit for failing to state a
claim under the federal Voting Rights Act when the plaintiffs instead stated their
claim under the National Voter Registration Act); Kirchheimer, supra note 36, at
515-17 (explaining the specialty principle as one approach to situations where
several legal prescriptions are applicable to the same offense).
225. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1957)
("Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which
otherwise might be controlling." (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285
U.S. 204, 208 (1932))).
226. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (per curiam); see id.
(explaining that, of two sections of the same broader statute dealing with income tax
exemption, the specific statute controlled over the general one).
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States Code, they are certainly interrelated as they apply to deceptive
or illegitimate trade practices. 227

If the statutes in question are of

such a relation that this maxim is applicable, then the construction
evinces an "either/or" approach in that it forces the construer to
choose between the two statutes.228
Furthermore, this maxim becomes particularly pertinent when
Congress has enacted a broad regulatory regime in one area,
complimented by carve-outs to address specific concerns.22 1
Spoofing and commodities manipulation exist in such a
framework. 230 For commodities fraud, the legislative history shows
that the statute was passed as part of a broad framework to allow
prosecutors more freedom and "flexibility" in pursuing
fraudsters.23 ' That the commodities fraud framework is broad
enough to encompass spoofing is almost explicitly endorsed in
Senator Pat Leahy's statement upon passage of the bill where he
noted that "[b]y covering all 'schemes and artifices' . . . [the] new

§ 1348 will be more accessible to investigators and prosecutors and
will

provide

needed

enforcement

flexibility . . . ."32

Clearly,

§ 1348 fraud was intended to be a "catch-all" to cover all new kinds
of scheme, and not stack on top of other criminal violations for
the same conduct.2 33

As such, if an individual is accused of

committing a spoofing violation, the statute specific to spoofing
should replace the more general violation of commodities fraud.

227. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012) (prohibiting defrauding anyone in
connection with, or fraudulently obtaining, commodities for future sale), with 7
U.S.C. § 6c(a) (5) (C) (2012) (prohibiting spoofing, or "bidding or offering with the
intent to cancel the bid or offer before the execution," in the course of trading).
228. See HCSC-Laundry, 450 U.S. at 6 (deciding whether a more specific tax
statute denied petitioner an exemption or whether a related but more general
statute granted one).
229. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 511-12 (applying lex generalis when evaluating
whether a specific provision relating to fiduciary breaches made inapplicable a broad
catch-all provision, but finding that because the specific statute reflected a certain
congressional concern in addition to the catch-all provision, the general statute did
not undermine the specific and both were applicable).
230. Compare 148 CONG. REC. S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (discussing the main goal in creating commodities fraud: giving prosecutors
more flexibility under a general statute), with Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED.
REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011) (drafting spoofing guidance with a
series of specific examples).
231. 148 CONG. REc. S7421 (daily ed.July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. See id. (noting that § 1348 will protect investors against "all the types [of]
schemes and frauds which inventive criminals may devise in the future").
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The second canon of construction that helps clarify the legal
questions underlying this particular double jeopardy inquiry is the
merger doctrine, exemplified in the Prince case.2 11 In Prince, the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the crime of
entering a bank with the intent to commit a robbery merges with the
crime of bank robbery once the robbery is committed.2 "
The
defendant in Prince robbed a bank with a revolver and was charged in
a two-count indictment with one count of robbery and one count of
entering the bank with the intent to commit a robbery. 3 Despite the
government's arguments, the Court found that each offense
contained the same essential nature and, therefore, merged.2 3 1
Applying this maxim to spoofing and commodities fraud, we can
see that the two statutes share the same essential nature.238 The heart
of each crime is intentional deception resulting in harm, as
exemplified by each statute's focus on bad faith manipulative
trading.2 39 The two statutes appear to work together within a
regulatory regime to ensure that all types of schemes and artifices are
punishable and that crimes do not go unpunished as criminals
2 " Furthermore, like the regulations
become more "inventive."o
in
Prince, there is no clear congressional intent to stack penalties for
these offenses.24 ' As such, the spoofing and commodities fraud
234. See Kirchheimer, supra note 36, at 518 (exploring the merger doctrine as it
relates to the intersection of a preparatory, attempted, and consummated crime).
235. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957) (holding that the defendant
must be convicted on the robbery count only). However, it is important to note that
the Court specifically stated that its holding in the case was to be narrowed to the
statute at issue and not expanded to cases at large involving "fragmentation of crimes
for the purposes of punishment." Id. at 325.
236. Id. at 324.
237. Id. at 328 (noting that the gravamen of the offense of entering is not the
actual act of entering, which would be satisfied by "simply walking through an
open, public door").
238. See Disruptive Practices Guidance, 76 FED. REG. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed
Mar. 18, 2011) (trading an increased scope of enforcement for greater security in
preserving legitimate trading activity).
239. See id. (creating a good faith trading exception consistent with statutory
priorities); see also Pazicky, supra note 172, at 811-12 (discussing how a "scheme or
artifice" that constitutes commodities fraud must be construed in light of the
statute's protection of legitimate mail and wire activity).
240. 148 CONG. REc. S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
241. See Prince, 352 U.S. at 327 (finding that it was "manifestly the purpose of
Congress" to create separate offenses rather than to "pyramid the penalties"); see also
S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 20 (2002) (offering no evidence that commodities fraud as a
charge was intended to do anything more than be a flexible option for prosecutors
to use to convict criminals engaged in new, undefined crimes).
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statutes should be enforced together, but punishments should be
handed down under only one statute.
CONCLUSION

Indictments for criminal spoofing will only become more
commonplace as regulators learn to adjust to a new breed of highfrequency traders.4 1 If the indictments continue to feature charges of
both spoofing and commodities fraud for the same transaction, they will
eventually be challenged under a claim of double jeopardy.243
The elements of spoofing may be fairly reduced to two: (1) the
common theme of entering orders with the intent to cancel before
execution; and (2) the intent to cancel must be in bad faith with no
legitimate underlying business reason.
The elements of commodities
fraud may be simply stated as: (1) a fraudulent intent to knowingly and
harmfully deceive; (2) through the use of a scheme or artifice furthering
the fraudulent intent; (3) in connection with a commodity.245
Every act of spoofing satisfies the commodities fraud element of
fraudulent intent to knowingly and harmfully deceive. A spoofed
trade is intentionally fraudulent by definition-it was entered into
with the intent to cancel.24 ' Additionally, a spoofed trade is harmful
because it puts other market participants at an artificially
disadvantageous market position until the spoof is complete.24 ' Every
act of spoofing satisfies the commodities fraud element of using a
scheme or artifice to further the fraudulent intent. 24 Spoofing is a
scheme or artifice because it is an intentional, planned action that
results in harm to the victims, which satisfies analogous mail and wire

242. See Michaels et al., supra note 14 (reporting that the CYTC, SEC, DOJ, and the
NewYork Attorney General are now all aggressively monitoring for spoofing activities).
243. See supra Part I.D. (discussing double jeopardy implications for charges with
the same elements).
244. See supra notes 143-66 and accompanying text (simplifying the elements of
spoofing under the direction of Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911)).
245. See supra notes 167-86 and accompanying text (applying Gavieres in the same
manner to commodities fraud).
246. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text (using the CFTC's spoofing
guidance and the facts alleged in Coscia's indictment to show how spoofing
mechanically involves elements of fraud).
247. See Henning, supranote 17 (explaining how spoofing is not a victimless crime
because the market distortion caused by spoofing not only forces other traders to buy
at inflated prices, but also changes their trading patterns, often times at great cost).
248. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (commenting that because the
CFTC guidance includes a good faith defense, spoofing by definition will always satisfy the
scheme or artifice requirement of commodities fraud as illicit trading behavior).
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fraud requirements for a scheme or artifice."' Every act of spoofing
is made in connection with a commodity because the spoofed trade
involves the purchase and sale of such products. 25 o
Because every act of spoofing is also an act of commodities
manipulation, under the Blockburger test, a defendant cannot be
constitutionally convicted of both for the same illicit transaction.5
The test provides that where proof of one offense necessarily proves
another in its entirety, a defendant cannot be constitutionally
convicted of both offenses.25 2 As the preceding analysis shows, a
conviction for spoofing and commodities fraud attached to the same
transaction would be invalidated under Blockburger because of the
complete overlap of their elements.
Additionally, two canons of statutory construction help to
5
illuminate this principle further: lex specialis derogat lex generaliS2M
(specialized laws prevail over generalized laws) and the merger
doctrine.2 5 ' Both in operation and perception, the spoofing statute is
a specialized subset of the overarching regulatory framework created
by the commodities manipulation statute.2 55 Both the prevailing
opinions of industry insiders and explicit congressional intent evince
the understanding that commodities fraud as part of the SarbanesOxley regime is supposed to function as a fraud catch-all, whereas the
spoofing guidance is meant to apply only to a particular subset of
fraudulent behavior.2 " As such, an act of spoofing should only be
249. See id. (emphasizing the connection between an intent to defraud, a
scheme or artifice requiring such intent, and the statutory framework established
by a good faith defense).
250. See supra notes 183-86 (expanding upon the "in connection with" principle).
A "connection with" a commodity is an extremely low standard and is essentially met
in every instance. See, e.g., United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613, 2006 WL
2224518, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quipping that "in connection with" a commodity
concerns such a broad range of actions that the status of the victims-be they
pension funds or complex trading super-computers-is largely irrelevant).
251. Blockburgerv. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 115-39 (showing that giving priority to more specific statutes
over general ones is common practice in criminal law).
254. See supra notes 129-31 (combining two offenses into one when the elements
of the lesser offense are also contained in the other, more serious offense).
255. See supra notes 219-29 (summarizing the industry perception of spoofing as
simply a specific form of fraud and documenting the difference in legislative
implementation between spoofing and commodities fraud).
256. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (declaring in no uncertain terms that commodities fraud under SarbanesOxley gives prosecutors a broad, flexible cause of action); see also Roundtable, supra
note 42, at 21 (describing how most traders view spoofing as merely one way to
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spoofing, and not both. The merger doctrine allows for a construction
of two statutes whereby the lesser can be merged into the greater if the
two share a gravamen, or essential nature.
Spoofing and
commodities fraud share an essential nature-that of deceitfully
bending and manipulating other market actors for personal gain.25 1
As prosecutors adapt to chase new types of cyber-criminals, they
should be wary of the double jeopardy implications for layered
indictments. Convenience or uncertainty should not determine the
charges a criminal defendant faces.

commit the broader sin of manipulating the market).
257. See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text (explaining the difference
between the unused common law merger and the merger found in Prince v. United
States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957), which determines whether statutes are meant to
operate together or to the exclusion of one another).
258. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text (noting the similarities
between the spoofing guidance's focus on completely illegitimate trading behavior
with the commodities fraud statute's definition of "scheme or artifice").

